Organized surveillance, especially by governments poses a major challenge to individual privacy, due to the resources governments have at their disposal, and the possibility of overreach. Given the impact of invasive monitoring, in most democratic countries, government surveillance is, in theory, monitored and subject to public oversight to guard against violations. In practice, there is a difficult fine balance between safeguarding individual's privacy rights and not diluting the efficacy of national security investigations, as exemplified by reports on government surveillance programs that have caused public controversy, and have been challenged by civil and privacy rights organizations.
INTRODUCTION
With increases in connected devices and electronic communications becoming the mainstay of human interactions, monitoring of human electronic activities have become pervasive both by companies trying to use the information for business advantage and governments trying to surveil citizens for national security and criminal activities [31] . Organized surveillance, particularly by state actors poses a serious challenge to an individual's privacy on account of the resources at disposal and its potential for overreaching use [11, 31] . Further, individual or representative entities do not have a mechanism to audit the surveillance, even after it's completion, to assess if their rights were violated.
To motivate the discussion, we use the well-known United States Surveillance law, namely Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), it's amendments, and it's corresponding processes as an example. Similar laws exist in other countries, e.g., the Investigatory Powers Act in the UK, and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act in Australia. Several studies have shown that said processes, although technically auditable, tend to be opaque and seldom fully auditable, even when the audit is performed by powerful oversight bodies, such as the US Congress [31, 40] .
In these monitoring processes, the active players include the law enforcement/intelligence gathering agency (L) that makes the surveillance request; the judge/court (J ) that grants the requests; and the company (C) that provides the data corresponding to the request. The other actors include the individual (I ) being surveilled and other users/agencies, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) [6] whose mission is to defend and safeguard individual privacy rights. The steps in the process generally start with the agency L requesting a court order from the judge J . If J approves the request, she creates a sealed court order, which can only be unsealed by L for the company C; the sealed order can be unsealed for the public after a pre-defined time (set during the issue of the order). The company C either accepts the request and provides the data or challenges the order on perceived violations. Once all parties agree, C sends the data requested. The agency L and company C can iteratively request and transmit data respectively several times, as needed, within the purview of the order. Challenges and Motivation: The said monitoring processes present several issues that hinder accountability and public auditability, that are desirable for transparency: 1) The fact that there exists a sealed order is not publicly notified. 2) Further, as per studies [35] , there is no systematic mechanism to unseal orders. In the absence of information, there is no way for the public to even know if there is any order, let alone request its unsealing when the sealing date expires. Note that an order not getting unsealed might not necessarily mean the judge issuing the order is malicious, rather, the judge might simply forget to unseal the order at the right time.
3) An important missing piece in all accountability mechanisms today is that there is no way to make sure that exchanges happening between L and C, at the time of the surveillance, followed the letter and spirit of the sealed order (enabling an auditable trail). 4) The scalability of the processes given the number of requests (around 16K to 33K, as discussed below) and the frequency of exchanges between/among the parties has not been explored.
Currently the only information that is publicly available is summarized information from the courts themselves or from annual aggregate reporting by companies [21, 27] . For instance, the FISA court rulings present the number of requests made under different sections, the number fully or partially granted, and the number denied. For example in 2018, 1204 requests were submitted for Sections U.S.C. 50 §1805 and §1804, with 868 granted, 308 modified, 41 partly denied, and 18 completely denied. However, this information usually tends to be high level aggregate statistics, and are not useful for public accountability. It does not equip individuals being surveilled with the means to determine if any of the players involved (law enforcement agencies, companies) reached beyond the ambit of the court's order, or if they were unfairly surveilled, e.g., wholesale or dragnet surveillance.
As a result, the exchanges and dealings between governments conducting surveillance, citizens being surveilled, and non-profit privacy advocates and organizations, are uneasy at best, and pugnacious at worst. This is evidenced in the steady stream of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of various government surveillance programs, raising pertinent questions about the legality and ethics of the surveillance itself, and if citizens' privacy and constitutional rights were violated [34, 41, 42] .
Google's transparency report [27] states the number of user data and account requests made over a six-month period and the proportion of requests under each category (such as subpoena and search warrants). Notable is the fact that the number of requests to Google have been rising steadily for the last five years, e.g., in the US, 16 ,407 user data requests for roughly 31,072 user accounts for year 2012, to 32,877 user data requests corresponding to roughly 68,456 user accounts in 2017.
For the first months of 2018 (the last reported data), there were 20,936 user requests for approximately 62,142 user accounts. Similar reports are also available from other companies, such as Microsoft and Facebook [19, 30] . According to our findings, frequently, the information presented is scarce and there are neither well-defined mechanisms to audit surveillance processes from the outset, nor to enable the surveilled individual the capability to assess postcompletion of the surveillance whether the search violated their privacy rights, e.g., the right of citizens to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, per the US Constitution's Fourth Amendment.
Contributions: In this paper, we propose our framework, SAMPL that addresses the challenges mentioned above. Our novel contributions include: i) Design of SAMPL: a generic and scalable framework for accountability of monitoring processes. ii) Capability for auditing the compliance of the entities over the lifetime of the surveillance order, from the outset, using cryptographic techniques, such as zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs), and Pedersen commitments. We introduce an entity called Enforcer who serves as the conduit for interactions between law enforcement/intelligence gathering agencies and companies, and verifies their interactions to guarantee compliance. We qualitatively prove that auditability of the surveillance process when the court order is active is only possible if an entity like our proposed enforcer serves as the conduit for information and the process does not leak information about the surveillance to the public, just provides audit insights. iii) A case study of our system in the context of the US legal system. iv) Security analysis of the the proposed framework. v) Validation of the framework using a near-real world implementation to assess scalability. Outline: In Section 2, we review related work. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the system model, and threat model and privacy/security properties, respectively. In Section 5, we present our construction for SAMPL; in Section 6 we discuss SAMPL in the context of the US legal system; and in Section 7, we present the security analysis for SAMPL. In Section 8, we present our implementation of the framework and our evaluations to demonstrate both feasibility and scalability. In Section 9, we discuss possible enhancements, extensions and generalizations of SAMPL. For better readability, we give the proof of security of SAMPL in the appendix.
RELATED WORK
Our related work falls into three broad categories: auditing and access control mechanisms, dragnet surveillance, and surveillance with accountability. We review each of these below.
Auditing and access control mechanisms: Goldwasser and Park [25] proposed cryptographic mechanisms involving ZKPs and commitments to provide auditability in the application of secret laws. For example, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court operations are classified, and the court typically hears arguments only from government agencies [22] . While the focus of [25] was on providing the public auditable records that secret laws were correctly applied by courts, our focus is on verifying whether the interactions between the law enforcement agencies and companies, follow the letter and spirit of a court's order.
Bates et al. [8] proposed mechanisms to enable secure audits of wiretapping systems. Kroll et al. [28] designed a way for entities such as companies, law enforcement/intelligence-gathering agencies to prove using cryptographic techniques that they are authorized to access data such as phone records and email data. These works focus on providing auditability using encrypted audit logs that are not accessible to the general public, whereas our goal is to focus on public accountability. Kamara [29] proposed a mechanism for federal agencies to carry out warranted tapping on phones of users, which focuses on providing access-control, not public accountability.
Dragnet surveillance: Segal et al. [38, 39] focused on building mechanisms to avoid contact chaining, where a large number of users get pulled into a surveillance net, chiefly because they were associated with a legitimate target of surveillance. Their accountability mechanism ensures that government agencies can safely disclose statistics such as number of warrants per month and maximum number of individuals affected per warrant. [24] , proposed a system which deals with accountability in secret processes, which is most relevant to our work. There are two significant differences between [24] and our work: 1) [24] requires law enforcement agencies and companies to post cryptographic commitments and ZKPs to the blockchain at regular intervals. Moreover, in their system, honest parties are trusted to log information regularly, and honest parties are expected to report dishonest logging whenever they see it. There are two problems with this: firstly, government agencies and companies might be forgetful, and cannot be trusted to post information regularly to a public ledger. Secondly, companies might be loath to report possibly dishonest logging by law enforcement agencies when they see it, fearing retribution. 1 We remove this requirement by introducing an independent auditor, called Enforcer (E), who can keep both, the company and the law enforcement agency in check. 2) In [24] , ZKPs created by an agency and/or company are basically a proof that they are aware of the court's surveillance order. A ZKP is a proof of knowledge, not compliance; merely proving knowledge of the contents of a court's orders does not guarantee that the agency/company are complying with the court's orders. In our system, the Enforcer explicitly verifies that the data requested by the law enforcement agency, and given by the company are within the ambit of the court's surveillance order. This is done in a privacy-preserving manner such that the Enforcer does not actually get to know the user's data (e.g., emails), but is able to verify that the agency is not over-requesting data, and the company is not over-sharing data.
SYSTEM MODEL
Parties: In our system, there are six parties: the individual being surveilled I , company C that I has an account (e.g., e-mail) with, law enforcement/intelligence gathering agency L requesting the surveillance, Judge J who can potentially issue the surveillance order on I , and an Enforcer E, who enforces accountability of L and C's operations, by ensuring that L does not request more information about I than what is authorized by J , and C does not over-share information about I , more than what is authorized by J . Finally our system has a set of interested users, U, made up of civil-rights and/or non-profit organizations (e.g., American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)) whose mission is to protect and preserve individuals' privacy as defined by laws. We assume that all communication between J , L, C, E, I , and U takes place via secure and authenticated channels. They use each other's public and verification keys, respectively to encrypt and authenticate all communication between them.
We note that I ⊂ I, where I is a set of individuals who have an account with C. Our table of notations is given in Table 1 . Identities of an individual I : In our system, an individual I has three identities associated with her:
A real identity, RI which may correspond to I 's e-mail address that is being surveilled. RI is established between I and C when I signs up for service with C. In our system RI is represented by a verification/signing key-pair: RI = (V K RI , SK RI ). The company C stores V K RI and V K RI is known only to J, L, and C. In particular, RI will not be known to E. We assume that RI is stored safely by I , does not get compromised, and acts as the root-of-trust for all other keys involving I .
An anonymized identity, AI, which corresponds to a nickname associated with RI. When a user signs up for service with a company, they are asked to create the anonymized identity AI which is linked by C to their real identity RI. The user can create only one anonymous identity with a service provider (e.g., one nickname per e-mail address). We represent AI by a keypair: AI = (V K AI , SK AI ). We use anonymized identities to avoid having the enforcer know RI. The company C stores V K AI which is known and revealed to E, J, L, and C during the surveillance period.
A pseudonymous identity, PI i ; i ∈ [1.
.m], represented by PI = (V K PI i , SK PI i ) which corresponds to I 's pseudonym associated with AI. The pseudonymous identity can be chosen from a set of m identities, with the restriction that only one pseudonymous identity can be active at any given point of time, and a pseudonymous identity cannot be reused. Pseudonymous identities, as opposed to real and anonymized identities, are transient key-pairs. V K PI is known and revealed to E, J, L, and C. The company stores all historical V K PI s for future verification. An individual storing data on company servers: Although SAMPL enables the auditing of a broad range of data and application types, for illustration in this paper we use user emails. In Section 9, we generalize this requirement. When an individual I signs up for service with a company C, it interactively creates a symmetric key K C I to be shared between C and I . I uses K C I to encrypt sensitive information, but keeps the date and time as plaintext and signs the whole message. K C I can be updated periodically. C and I agree on two parameters, bSize and bNum, which denote batch size and batch number.
The batch size represents the intervals at which the user's messages are batched. The batch number indicates the batch a given message originates from. Let I 's total data records, e.g., emails be denoted by T . Then bNum = T /bSize, bSize can be a static or dynamic parameter. In the static case, I sets up bSize at the time of service initiation with C, and doesn't change it; in the dynamic case, bSize can be changed by I as needed. SAMPL supports both these implementation choices.
I creates and encrypts each email with K C I before sending it to C. At the end of each batch, C creates a Merkle tree with the hashes of all messages in the batch at the leaves. C sends the root hash of the Merkle tree to I . I verifies the root hash calculation, signs it if accepts, and sends it to C. All signatures contain a timestamp which has sign date and time. C then discards the Merkle tree and archives just the signed root hash, since C can create the Merkle tree on demand from the stored ciphertexts as needed. Role of Enforcer, E: Each communication between L and C involves them independently passing the message to E for verification. Once E verifies that the message is not over-requesting or oversharing data with respect to an approved court order, the message is passed on to the intended recipient (C or L). When surveillance data from C is approved by E and received by L, C sends the shared key, K C I directly to L, who can can then decrypt the information and carry out the investigation.
We envision the enforcer to be a government watchdog or organization that oversees adherence to laws and rights by private companies and law enforcement agencies. Federal agencies have their own oversight entities, e.g., FBI is audited by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Other federal agencies also have their corresponding auditing entities. These entities currently do auditing when needed, and hence the auditing always happens after the event. We propose that the OIG plays a proactive role in auditing such process, and enforce accountability from the beginning, rather than play a reactive role and issue review and audit reports after-the-fact, as it currently does. Blockchain and its operations: The blockchain, BC, is used as an official record for verification of actions performed, we use it as an off-the-shelf enabling technology. When forwarding a request, each entity posts a signed hash of the request/response to the blockchaina transaction-all messages posted on the BC are signed. The BC also serves as a platform to announce new cases to the public watch dogs and the general public without divulging investigation details. The miners ensure that only valid entities involved in an investigation can post transactions to the BC. We envision the implementation of SAMPL using a permissioned blockchain with read-only access given to public. For efficiency and fast convergence, proof-of-stake may be used as the distributed consensus mechanism. The infrastructure required for the BC may be maintained and managed by the judicial system to engender greater trust.
THREAT MODEL
We list trust assumptions on the parties in the system: Judge J : The judge J is assumed to be honest, but forgetful, i.e., J might forget to unseal records at the right time. J is trusted to correctly generate an Surveillance Order (SO) and place it on the BC. Whenever SO's seal expires, members of U can choose to contact J to make public the contents of SO. U can then verify details of case, including contacting I as needed. Law enforcement agency L: L is assumed to be malicious, in that L will try to over-request data beyond what is authorized by the SO issued by J (we discuss some overreaches in the real world in Section 6.2). Once the SO is posted by J on the blockchain, L will contact E with a surveillance request (SR). SR will be checked and ratified by E based on the SO and prevalent policies.
Company C: C is assumed to be malicious, in that C can over-share data beyond what is sought by the SR, and authorized by J 's SO. If C fails to respond to an SR with a surveillance request response (SRR), then there are policy measures that can be exercised by J to enforce compliance. Enforcer E: E verifies each SR generated by L and also verifies each SRR generated by C, respectively. We assume E is honest. The enforcer only knows I 's anonymized identity, AI and pseudonymous identity, PI. In particular, E is not privy to I 's real identity RI. E also does not have access to the plaintext version of I 's records stored with C (e.g., emails). When a certain threshold of failures on the part of L, C is reached (which can be a implementation specific system parameter), E can choose to contact J and post a message to BC exposing identity of the faulty party. The enforcer does not store information linking AI and PI after evaluating an SRR.
No collusion assumption: In our system, we assume L and C do not directly communicate with each other, and go through E for information exchanges. We believe if L and C break this protocol and interact directly, auditable data structures [26] may be used to verify the operations of C. However, out of band, unbridled data exchange is difficult to prevent when both parties are complicit. Nevertheless, for accountability, it is in L's and C's interest to act according to due process, and go through E, and not collude.
Privacy and security properties
SAMPL provides the following privacy and security properties: Accountability for L and C: We ensure that a malicious L and/or C cannot over-request, or over-share data, respectively, beyond that authorized by the SO, as long as they do not bypass the entire system, and collude via side-channels. This applies to both: over-requesting/over-sharing of the surveilled user's data, or data belonging to users not listed in the SO (not under surveillance). Forgetful J : Our system enables an independent set of users, U (e.g., non-profit organizations such as ACLU) who keep track of courtorder unsealing dates, to contact the courts to unseal non-sensitive information, contact the individuals who were being surveilled, and help them with further courses of action. Security against malicious I and C: We ensure that a malicious I cannot make C fail E's queries by creating fake ZKP for their real, anonymous and pseudonymous identities. Also, a malicious C cannot create fake data for I and frame I . We now give the computational assumption for our system.
Definition 4.1. (DDH Problem [10] ) We say that the DDH problem is hard relative to G if for all PPT algorithms A, there is a negligible function negl such that
where in each case the probabilities are taken over the experiment in which G(1 λ ) outputs (G, q, д), and then uniform x, y, z ∈ Z q are chosen.
DESCRIPTION OF SAMPL
As a pre-requisite to using SAMPL for surveillance, I and C interact to setup keys, associated ZKPs, and other operations as outlined in Section 5.1. Surveillance on user I 's data is carried out with interactions between J, L, C, and E as described in Section 5.2. We note that SAMPL has 7 protocols and 4 algorithms. We adopt the convention that communication protocols are run between two or more entities, and algorithms are computations done by a single entity. We recall that per our system model we assume that all communication between entities takes place over secure and authenticated channels.
Pre-Requisite for SAMPL
Protocols 1 and 2 bootstrap the communication between C and I , and the corresponding data exchange. These protocols are required so that in case of surveillance request by L for I 's data, E can verify the user data without gaining any knowledge about identity of I .
Protocol 1: This is run by an individual I the first time she sets up an email account with company C. In Line 1, I does two 3-round ZKPs with C to prove that: 1) V K AI was produced by someone who has knowledge of SK RI , and 2) V K PI i was generated by someone who has knowledge of SK AI (if C accepts V K AI as valid). At the end, C will receive from I a copy of V K AI , V K PI i and their associated ZKPs, π AI , π PI i , and signed copies of the ZKPs: σ AI = Sign S K RI (π AI ), σ PI i = Sign S K AI (π PI i ), along with some public verification metadata, zkpVerf , which will be used by the Enforcer for verifying the ZKPs. The proofs are Chaum-Pedersen-style interactive ZKPs [16] , which can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transform [20] . Since the ZKPs are essentially used as Protocol 1: Setup run between C and I .
Input : Public parameters: Group G, q = |G|, д, h ∈ G. Output : I establishes RI, AI, PI i , bSize and K C I with C.
Parties :C and I . 1 User I sets up (V K AI , SK AI ) and (V K PI i , SK PI i ), and sends the ZKPs, their verification metadata, and signatures on the ZKPs: (π AI , π PI i ), zkpVerf , and (σ AI , σ PI i ), respectively, to C. 2 User I sets up a shared key with C, K C I , used to encrypt I 's data stored on C's servers. 3 C and I agree upon and setup a batch-size, bSize ∈ Z + .
black-boxes, in order not to distract the reader with their details, we give the ZKPs and their description in Appendix A.
Next, I and C setup a shared key K C I using which I 's emails stored on C's servers are encrypted. I and C also agree upon a batch-size bSize, which denotes the message-intervals at which I 's emails will be batched, e.g., after every 100 emails. C will batch all of I 's emails at bSize intervals and create a Merkle hash tree for the batch with the hashes of the emails at the leaves; I will verify and sign the root of the tree.
Protocol 2: Exchange of data between C and I for a given batch.
Input : Public parameters: bSize, bNum ∈ [1.
.maxbNum].
Output : C stores I 's emails along with verification hashes.
Parties :C and I . 1 Let M bNum represent the set of all e-mail messages in bNum. C sends M bNum and R bNum to I .
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I verifies that the root hash (R bNum ) of M bNum is correctly computed: 10.1 If verification fails, I notifies C to retry.
sends σ R bNum to C and deletes all local copies of M x .
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C stores σ R bNum along with previously stored C x 's for batch bNum. end Protocol 2: Protocol 2 depicts I 's emails being stored on C's servers. Before I and C execute this algorithm, they would have already run Protocol 1 to setup the symmetric key K C I . I creates an email message M x and encrypts it with K C I , generating C x , before forwarding it to C (Lines 2,3,4). This already happens in OpenSSL, where the connections (and data transmitted) between two communicating entities are encrypted using pairwise symmetric session keys.
Protocol 3: J issuing SO and posting SO on BC.
Output : J issues SO, sets up keys K J LC , K E J LC and transmits them to relevant parties. Parties : E, J, L, and C. 1 L issues a request to J :
generates IO = (V K RI ||evidence) and gives to L. 3 L gives IO to C; C validates the IO. If "accept" ← Cdecide(IO), C sends to J and L, (V K AI ||σ AI ||π AI ), given to C by I in Protocol 1.
, and does the following:
and generates Pedersen commitments:
. P1 is encrypted with K J LC and hence is accessible only to J , L and C. P1 is transmitted to L and C for verification and signatures. 4.3 J verifies the received signatures of L and C on P1, and embeds the signatures of J, L, C on P1: σ J P 1 ,σ LP 1 , and σ C P 1 in P2, to preserve identity of L and C. 4.4 P2 contains V K AI , start/end dates ι = [t s , t e ], among other information, is encrypted with K E J LC , and sent to L and C for verification and signatures σ LP 2 , σ C P 2 . σ J P 2 , σ LP 2 , σ C P 2 are then appended to the SO as P3.
4.5
Generates SO ← OrderGen(V K AI ||V K RI ||evidence), which has format as described below:
At the end of the current batch bNum, let C bNum represent the set of all ciphertexts in bNum. C calculates hashes for all C x ∈ C bNum and uses them as leaves to create a Merkle hash tree M bNum (Lines 7,8). C sends M bNum and the root hash (R bNum ) of the Merkle tree to I (Line 9). I verifies that R bNum calculation is correct for the current batch. I signs the verified R bNum and sends σ R bNum to C (Line 10.2). I can then delete all the data stored locally since it is available for future retrieval from C. C stores σ R bNum and discards the Merkle tree for the batch (Line 11). This construction helps reduce the space overhead significantly. This process is repeated for all future batches. If I found R bNum to be wrongly calculated, then I does not sign R bNum and C is contacted to reconstruct the Merkle tree and try again (Line 10.1).
Surveillance
The communication model under SAMPL can be divided into four phases, which we depict in Figure 1 , and we give a high level idea of the phases in what follows.
Phase 1: Figure 1 : Steps 1-7, are described in Protocol 3, and represents the first phase of SAMPL. It describes collection of information by J to validate the need for an SO, create, and post it to BC. This allows members of U to verify public data in SO for accountability of L and C, and allows L to conduct surveillance on data for I . Phase 2: Figure 1 : Steps 8-11, are described in Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5, and represent the second phase of SAMPL. In Algorithm 4, L creates the SR corresponding to the SO created in Phase 1, and in Algorithm 5 we enforce accountability for L by having E verify the SR before sending it to C. Phase 3: Figure 1 : Steps 12-15, are described in Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7, and represent the third phase of SAMPL. In Algorithm 6, C creates the SRR corresponding to the SR received in Phase 2, and in Algorithm 7 we enforce accountability for C by having E verify the SRR before sending it to L.
Phase 4: Figure 1 : Step 16, is described in Protocol 8 and represents the fourth phase of SAMPL. In Protocol 8, L decrypts the user information and conducts the surveillance specified in the SO.
Protocol 3: Protocol 3 presents the interaction between J, L, C, and E, which culminates in J issuing a surveillance order SO, and setting up surveillance-related keys. In Line 1, L approaches J with evidence of suspicious behavior on the part of I which forms the surveillance request (SR). Here evidence represents the documented evidence supporting the SR. J has its own internal decision procedure, Jdecide using which it decides whether to accept or turn down the request (Line 2). If J decides to reject the request, L will have to return with an updated request SR = (V K RI ||evidence ′ ), if it wants to persist with the request.
If the request SR is accepted, J generates an intermediate order IO, and gives it to L who forwards it to C. If C decides to comply (according to Cdecide), it retrieves V K AI corresponding to V K RI , sends V K AI to L, along with π AI , and σ AI obtained in Protocol 1. L forwards this info to J (Line 3). If C decided to not comply with IO (e.g., request violates statutory company policy), C would address the reasons to L prompting potential intervention from J , which is a judicial matter and out of scope of SAMPL. On receiving info from Algorithm 4: L creating and posting SR on BC, and sending to E for verification.
Input :SO created on BC.
Output : Surveillance request SR created and sent to E. 1 begin 2 L creates a surveillance request:
3 L generates and posts H (SR) to BC.
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L sends SR to E, who handles it as described in Algorithm 5. 5 end C, J independently verifies the ZKP associated with V K AI and the signature on it (Line 4). If the verification fails, J notifies C and L, and exits. If the verification passes, J generates two symmetric keys: K J LC meant to be shared between J , L, and C, and K E J LC meant to be shared between E, J , L, and C. J then issues a surveillance order SO which is formatted as in Figure 2 . The metadata may include case number, date of unsealing, and Pedersen commitments Com 1 and Com 2 to K J LC and K E J LC , respectively (Line 4.1), and any other information that can be made public about the case. The commitments are needed to hold J accountable. Part 1 (P1) contains data meant to be shared between J , L, and C only, and includes V K RI and the evidence. P1 is encrypted with K J LC (Line 4.2), and the hash of the encrypted P1 is signed independently by J (σ J P 1 ), L (σ LP 1 ), and C (σ J P 1 ) (Line 4.3). These signatures are included inside Part 2 (P2) along with V K AI , start/end dates of surveillance (t s , t e ) respectively 2 . P2 is encrypted with K E J LC , before it is sent for verification and signing to J , L, and C which yield σ J P 2 , σ LP 2 and σ C P 2 , respectively on successful verification. Before C signs hash of encrypted P2, it verifies that V K AI contained in P2 corresponds to V K RI contained in P1 that it had signed, i.e., σ C P 1 .
These signatures are then verified by J , encrypted with K E J LC and added to SO as part of Part 3 (P3). The signatures are included in the encrypted text to preserve the identity of L and C from public until the SO is opened to public. Signatures on C P 1 and C P 2 are verified by E to hold J, L, and C accountable. The different kinds of SOs are discussed in Section 6.
Algorithm 4: This shows the surveillance request, SR created by L after J posts SO to the blockchain, BC. L creates an SR by creating a tuple with the start/end dates for the requested surveillance time interval, ι = [t s , t e ] (Line 2). L includes the AI of the intended surveillance target, V K AI . A reference to the original SO and the identity of C (whom the SR is intended for), is also included in the SR tuple. L then posts the hash of the SR on the BC and forwards SR to E for verification (Line 3,4). The time interval, ι = [t s , t e ] contained in SR is within the timeline specified in P2. 5 end 6 If E accepts SR, a confirmation is posted on BC. Since all BC transactions are signed, we denote the corresponding transaction signature as σ E SR ; and SR is forwarded to C. 7 If E rejects SR, it notifies agency L and judge J , and SR is not sent to C. It also stores evidence of the reason for rejection, which will be provided to J, L upon request.
Algorithm 5: Here E receives the SR from L and processes the SR. The verification includes checking that the time interval ι from SR is a sub-interval of the timeline contained in P2 of SO. After E verifies SR, it signs the hash, H (SR), and posts the signature σ E SR on BC. Then SR is forwarded to the C listed as intended receiver in SR. If SR fails to verify with E, no message is posted on the BC, and SR is not forwarded to C. If fine-grained accountability is desired, the failure message can be posted to BC, identifying the reason and scope of the failure. We discuss this further in Section 9.2. Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7 cover interaction between E and C, as depicted in Figure 3 , where C responds to an approved SR with an SRR containing requested user data. C selects user data that matches criteria outlined in SR (depicted by shaded items in Figure 3(b) ) and adds the data to SRR before sending it to E for verification. E verifies the SRR and either forwards it to L if approved or contacts C if verification failed.
Algorithm 6: When C receives a verified SR from E, C verifies that ι and V K AI listed in SR are the ones actually signed by C in P2 of SO (Line 2). C then creates an SRR in response to SR. C checks each message stored corresponding to V K AI listed in the SR. If some message M x in batch bNum matches the surveillance time ι in SR, then the encrypted message (C x ), the sibling hashes for H (C x ) inthe Merkle tree for bNum, and σ bNum are added to the SRR by C (Line 9). C also includes the ZKP for the V K PI j used to sign σ bNum (Line 9). Once C has finished processing all messages for the V K AI listed in SR, C adds identity of L to SRR and then posts a signed hash of SRR to BC (Line 13). SRR is then forwarded to E (Line 15).
For ease of exposition, we have presented SRR creation for one batch (bNum). If there exist multiple batches, bNum i ; i ∈ [1..T /bSize], where T is the total number of I 's messages stored on C, Line 7-11 of Algorithm 6 are repeated for all the batches. In Line 12, the SRR includes corresponding C, sibling hashes, batch number, root of the Merkle hash tree, concatenated in order.
Algorithm 7: E receives the SRR from C, and parses its contents. E verifies the signature (σ E SR ) on the corresponding SR (Line 1). For each C x that appears in SRR, E checks that the message is dated within the time period ι = [t s , t e ] from SR (Line 3). Then the root hash for C x , R bNum is computed using the sibling hashes for C x provided in SRR, and the signature σ R bNum is verified (Line 4). The ZKP for V K PI j used in σ R bNum is also verified by E (Line 5). If there are multiple batches, they are verified in succession at this time; as in Algorithm 6, we omit this part in the algorithm and this description for ease of exposition. After E verifies SRR, it signs H (SRR), and a message containing the signature of E is posted on BC, and SRR is forwarded to L listed as intended receiver in SRR (Line 7). If SRR failed to verify with E, no message is posted in the BC and SRR is not forwarded to L. If fine-grained auditing is required, a failure message can be written to the BC. Let C bNum represent the set of all ciphertexts in bNum.
where zkpVerf is some metadata given to C by I for ZKP verification (details in Appendix A, Protocol 11). Protocol 8: Once L receives a validated SRR from E, it posts a signature on the hash of SRR to BC as acknowledgment. L then asks C to hand over K C I to be able to decrypt I 's encrypted emails in SRR and conduct surveillance.
Protocol 9: This is not a part of the regular workflow of SAMPL and is optionally executed by members of U on an as needed basis. It can be implemented using smart contracts. In Protocol 9, any member(s) of a set of watchdog organizations, u ∈ U (e.g., ACLU), who monitor the BC, can contact J whenever an SO expires and retrieve K J LC , K E J LC . Entity u decrypts the SO (P1 and P2), verifies signatures (P3), and can contact I who was surveilled. I, u can then investigate and verify the validity of reason for surveillance, if due Algorithm 7: E verifying SRR received from C.
Input : SRR received from C. Output : Accept or reject SRR. 1 E retrieves SR from SRR, and verifies signature σ E SR posted on BC.
Finally, E verifies ZKP for V K PI j used to sign σ R bNum with given (σ AI ||π AI ||σ PI j ||π PI j ||д||zkpVerf ). 6 end 7 If E accepts SRR, a confirmation is posted on BC. Since all BC transactions are signed, we denote the corresponding transaction signature as σ E SRR ; and SRR is forwarded to L, who handles it as described in Protocol 8. 8 If E rejects SRR, it notifies J, C and SRR is not sent to L. It also stores evidence of the reason for rejection, which will be provided to J, C upon request. diligence was applied, and lawful procedures were followed during surveillance.
6 APPLICABILITY: CASE STUDY OF U.S.
LEGAL SYSTEM
In this section, we discuss how our system can be instantiated and adapted in a real-world legal system to provide accountability. We consider the U.S. legal system as an example, and discuss our system within its constitutional and jurisdictional parameters. SAMPL can be modified to be applicable to legal systems in other countries.
Different Authorization Paths
The U.S. constitution provides several authorization paths for law enforcement agencies to obtain permission to conduct surveillance, some with judicial oversight, some without. We discuss them below. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA): ECPA was created by the U.S. Congress in 1986 [17] to elucidate the boundaries of government surveillance on citizens, and clearly define the ways and means by which government surveillance can be conducted. 4 ECPA can be used by federal law enforcement agencies to obtain information about users' emails in transit, emails at rest, phone calls, location data, and more. ECPA provides law enforcement agencies two methods of accessing users' information: via warrant, or via subpoena. A subpoena is a court order demanding that someone or something be provided to assist in a case. For issuing a warrant, the law enforcement agency must show the issuing judge probable cause that a crime has been, or will be committed. Most warrants are unsealed when charges are filed against someone, and the defendant has the right to see the evidence collected against them before the trial. Per ECPA statute 18 U.S.C. §2616 [3] and statute 18 U.S.C. §2703 [4], emails in transit, emails in storage on home computer, and unopened emails in remote storage stored for ≤ 180 days all need a warrant for law enforcement access. Opened emails in remote storage, and unopened emails stored for > 180 days only need a subpoena for law enforcement access.
Our system can be deployed in a straightforward manner in both cases, as described in Section 5, where the SO written to the blockchain by J can be either a subpoena or a warrant. The SR and the furnished data are all routed through the Enforcer, E, who writes the data transfer success/failure to the blockchain BC for auditing (refer Section 5). National Security Letter (NSL): The USA PATRIOT Act §505 [36, 37] empowered the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to issue a National Security Letter compelling companies to disclose information about their customers for a national security-related investigation. An NSL is typically issued to a company by a local FBI field office and does not require judicial oversight. It can be used to obtain meta-information about phone/email records, times, length of service, network addresses, how a customer paid for service; although the FBI cannot obtain actual content of phone/email records. An NSL can also be used by the FBI to obtain financial details, such as credit reports, and bank account details from banks, credit unions and insurance companies. Any recipient of an NSL is prohibited by law or "gagged" from disclosing their receipt of the NSL, which makes oversight difficult. Additionally, the U.S. government can seek judicial enforcement of an NSL in non-compliance situations, under ECPA statute 18 U.S.C. §2709.
Since NSL does not require a judge, there is no J to post the SO to BC. But L and C can still use SAMPL and hence E for auditability. L would create an SO for the NSL, post it on BC, and then create an SR, before sending it to E. E would then pass it on to C, after checking that the SO and the SR does not request content of emails (which is a legal restriction on NSLs). Note that E cannot check if an SO is for a genuine national security issue, since U.S. law expressly gives discretionary powers to the FBI while deciding to issue NSLs. But what E can help check is if the SO and SR adhere to legal guidelines, that is, the agency is only seeking meta-information. On receipt of the SR from E, C will construct and return an SRR to E, who will then verify it and send it to L.
Our pseudonymous identity scheme prevents E from learning the actual identities of the users whose details were requested. As discussed before, E writes the pass/fail result of the SR and SRR to the BC. The legal/political feasibility of writing encrypted NSLs to the BC is out of the scope of this paper. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): FISA was enacted in 1978 and amended in 2008 by the U.S. Congress for the purposes of surveillance related to foreign powers and persons [22] . Under FISA, a person who is believed to be a foreign power, or spying on behalf of a foreign power can be put under surveillance, even if they haven't engaged in any criminal activity. Over the years, the ambit of FISA has gradually expanded to include electronic surveillance, "roving wiretap" surveillance, pen-registers, and trapand-trace devices, per 50 U.S.C. Ch. 36 [5] . Additionally, FISA permits warrantless surveillance 5 up until certain time periods, beyond which the agency conducting the surveillance needs to obtain a warrant from a special court called the FISA court [23] . Although the court maintains records of its proceedings, the FISA court's records are not available to the public.
Our system can be applied to the FISA ecosystem, which encompasses the court, and surveilling agencies which work with it, such as the NSA. The FISA ecosystem operates with little to no auditability (other than annual aggregate statistics published by the court). Using our system, the FISA court judges will issue and post an encrypted SO on the BC. The E can verify that the surveillance is not conducted in wholesale or an overarching manner by agencies, and only data that is pertinent to an ongoing investigation is revealed by companies. In particular, our system allows independent non-profit organizations (e.g., ACLU) to verify if due process has been followed during FISA-authorized surveillance, even if the actual court orders are never made public, without compromising national security.
Law Enforcement Agencies Overreach:
Violations, "sneak peeks" and more
In the U.S. legal system, a government agency, e.g., FBI or NSA is, in most cases, required to present a warrant to a company for conducting surveillance on its customers, and conduct the surveillance within the confines of the warrant. Unfortunately, in practice, there are agency overreaches; we outline a few here. In 2018, the NSA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) in its first semi-annual unclassified report to the U.S. Congress described the investigations and activities of the NSA [32] . Among other findings, the OIG 5 One such program has recently come to light [41] .
report found "several deficiencies that have the potential to impact the protection of U.S. persons privacy rights," in relation to FISA investigations conducted by the NSA. A report by the Department of Justice (DoJ) OIG found that the FBI issued NSLs "contrary to statutory limitations, " issued "improper requests under the statute referenced in the NSL", "obtained information beyond the time period referenced in the NSL," and various other illegal uses of NSLs [1] . A partially redacted 300-page report by the DoJ OIG [2] also found that the FBI acquired phone call information regarding "hot numbers" without legal process, made inaccurate statements to the FISA court, and improperly used FBI administrative subpoenas. The OIG report also finds that the FBI uses "exigent letters" and other informal requests for phone records that do not comply with legal requirements or FBI policies governing the acquisition of those records. The same report also found the FBI has a practice of conducting "sneak peeks" for telephone toll records in providers' databases without due process, a practice that violates the ECPA statute 18 U.S.C. §2702(a)(3).
All said, our system will help systematize a seemingly unpredictable process that would help law enforcement agencies and companies ensure that they follow the letter of the law with respect to issuing and responding to surveillance requests respectively.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
We prove the security of our constructions in the well-known Universal Composability (UC) framework [12] . The UC paradigm elegantly captures the conditions under which a given distributed protocol is secure, by comparing it to an ideal realization of the protocol. To this end, the UC framework defines two "worlds": the real-world, where the protocol, π to be proved secure runs in the presence of a real-world adversary, A. The other is the idealworld, where the entire protocol, ϕ is executed by an ideal, trusted functionality, in the presence of a simulator, S, which models the ideal-world adversary. All users only talk to an ideal functionality via secure and authenticated channels, the ideal functionality takes input from users, performs some computations in a possibly interactive manner, and returns the output of the protocol. The goal then is to prove that no distinguishing algorithm, commonly called as "environment", Z, can successfully distinguish between the execution (EXEC) of the two worlds.
Design of Ideal Functionalities
We define an ideal functionality, F Surveil which encompasses all our other functionalities and algorithms, and consists of four independent ideal functionalities,
Furthermore, we assume that F Surveil maintains internal state that is accessible at any time to F SAMPL zk , F init , F create , F BC . We describe the functionalities of F Surveil , discuss some of their motivating design choices, and give the proof of the following theorem in Appendix B.
Theorem 7.1. Let F Surveil be an ideal functionality for SAMPL. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary for SAMPL, and let S be an ideal-world PPT simulator for F Surveil . SAMPL UCrealizes F Surveil for any PPT distinguishing environment Z. 
EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of SAMPL for scalability, and to benchmark the operations performed by different entities within SAMPL with varying system parameters and surveillance requirements.
Experimental Setup
Four Desktop class machines with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700K CPUs and 8 GB RAM each were used to run our implementation of SAMPL. Each of the machines ran a single entity in SAMPL: J , E, L, and C, communicating over C Sockets. The entities were coded using the C programming language and compiled with gcc version 7.3.0 (Ubuntu 7.3.0-27 ubuntu1 18.04). Our code, along with test data generators, and a small test database is available online [33] . Random user data, for 500 users, was pre-generated and stored in an SQL database (we use email as the representative application) at C. User data was created for 120 days. In our experiment, RI for a given user is tied to their real name and each user has an AI tied to their name in the database, where the AI is a key pair that is tied to the user's PI i ; i ∈ [1..m] using ZKPs. We simulated with only a single PI i for each user's data, during the surveillance period. The cryptographic operations of signing and verifying user data, and ZKP related operations were prototyped using the Charm Cryptographic framework [7] . AES-256 in GCM mode was used for the symmetric key encryption involving K C I , K J LC , and K E J LC . For emulating the blockchain in SAMPL, we used Ethereum [18] . Each entity ran its own Ethereum node and communicated with the local blockchain network.
Metrics and Parameters
Separate simulations were run for 5, 10, 15, and 30 users in the SO posted by J . The surveillance periods simulated were 5, 10, 20, and 50 days. These aforementioned values (number of users, days) were chosen to demonstrate scalability in the event of concurrency. We evaluate SAMPL using the following metrics:
(1) ZKP generation and verification time per user: The Prime192v1 Elliptic Curve was used as the prime order group G for ZKP as described in Protocol 11.
(2) Merkle root generation and signing per user: Simulations were run for batch-sizes with 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256, leaves in the tree with message sizes set to 1 KB, 75 KB, 1 MB, and 2 MB.
(3) Enforcer Verification Time: Measured for 5, 10, 15, and 30 users, batch sizes of 32 and 64 messages, and surveillance period of 5, 10, 20, and 50 days. The message size was set to 75 KB.
Verification of SR by E as depicted in Figure 1: Step 11, is not quantified in the results because it does not involve complex cryptographic operations. This step would incur a low computational cost regardless of the number of AIs and duration of surveillance in SR, as it only involves comparisons and range checks between SR and the corresponding SO on BC. Table 2 reflects the ZKP verification and generation times per user averaged over 100 runs. The generation time is calculated for the setup in Protocol 1 (only establishment of PI: ref. Protocol 11). The average ZKP generation time was 1.02 ms with a standard deviation of 0.236 ms. This time is expended when an I signs up for a new account with C or whenever I establishes a new PI with C. The verification time is calculated for an E verifying the user data inside SRR (calculated once per SRR). The verification time was found to be 1.066 ms with standard deviation of 0.096 ms. Figure 4a shows the verification time of SRR by E for different number of I s in SR, and different surveillance periods, for a batch size of 32 messages. Figure 4b shows the SRR verification time, for a batch size of 64 messages. We observed a linear increase in computation time with an increase in the number of users. We note that the computation time includes the ZKP verifications, the Merkle tree generation and root signature verification (one per user), and doing the date range checks on the data.
Results
Comparison of Figures 4a and 4b shows that the verification of SRR for batch size of 64 messages is faster by roughly 0.65 s. This difference is because for the same number of total messages, larger batch sizes will result in less Merkle tree roots and signature verification operations when compared to smaller batch sizes. In our simulations, SRR verification for 10 users for a surveillance period of 30 days involved processing 299 batches with the batch size of 32 messages, as opposed to 153 batches with 64 messages. Similarly, number of batches processed for 30 users over 30 days involved processing 898 batches with 32 messages and 460 batches with 64 messages. Figure 4c shows the computation time at C at the end of each batch. Batch sizes of 16, 32, 64, 128 , and 256 messages were simulated for messages sizes of 1 KB, 75 KB, 1 MB, and 2 MB, averaged over 50 runs. The larger message sizes represent emails with attachments. The computation time for the different message sizes converges as the batch size grows. This is because once the hashes of the messages are calculated for leaves of the Merkle tree, the rest of the operations on Merkle trees of given batch size are the same for messages of different sizes. For Merkle trees with larger messages initial hash computation of the leaves of the tree has to deal with larger data size.
To give a fine-grained analysis of components of SRR verification at E, we give a break down of the computation time in Table 3 . For each step, it does follow that the amount of time taken is linear, as the number of users and/or surveillance period is increased, hence showing the scalability of our approach. We note that the total time for operations performed on a given SRR depicted in Table 3 are lower than the computation time depicted in Figures 4a. This is due to the extra operations for look ups and other input-output operations performed by E on SRR during the verification.
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss some generalizations and possible enhancements of SAMPL.
Generalization
SAMPL can apply to other types of surveillance criteria by modifying the way user records are stored by C. In case of email, the sender and receiver names and their IP addresses could be salted and hashed separately and stored along with other details such as date and time as the metadata. This information could be listed in the SO and subsequently verified by E without learning the actual values. This will enable search based on sender/receiver names and/or IP addresses. Searchable encryption [9] can be implemented to search based on specific keywords in the data records. Although this increases the types of surveillance auditable, it leaks more information to E. SAMPL can also be extended to allow a user to delete historical records. The user would update the data record to a generic "deleted message," the Merkle root for the given historical batch would be recalculated with the new message, and the user would sign the updated Merkle root with the current SK P I . Every time V K PI gets updated by the user, C verifies the ZKP and also verifies the signatures on the Merkle root so that I cannot inject fake data/signatures to frame an honest C. For practicality, the management of users' V K PI s can be handled by software like keystores, plugins, etc.
There can be instances where a single user is part of multiple surveillance requests. In that case, each SO has V K AI , and E can link it to the corresponding V K PI using the ZKP provided by C. Our framework does not provide unlinkability of the independent surveillances to a user's V K PI . The problem of malicious enforcers leaking information about the V K AI s is not addressed by us.
SR can also include requests for system logs showing activity of a certain user identified by V K AI . If the logs contain V K RI , to preserve privacy, C can replace it with V K AI . If the logs contain V K PI , then C furnishes the ZKP associated with V K PI . Unlike data such as emails, users do not see the logs, hence do not sign them.
Enhancements and Adaptability
There are several design choices in our system that are implementationspecific. We list some below:
(1) Set of Enforcers: We can relax the assumption on the E from honest to being honest but curious. To provide unlinkability of users' PIs over multiple surveillances for a given time period, nonoverlapping striping of data across the set of Es, when sending SR or SRR could be used. Note that the sets of enforcers chosen by L and C need not be the same. This would increase the efficiency of verification of the system, as data for verification is not duplicated between different Es. As long as the number of SOs for a given AI does not exceed the number of enforcers in the system, the unlinkability assumption will hold (due to the non-overlapping striping).
(2) Internal decision procedures of J, L, and C: Certain actions are largely dependent on the specific jurisdiction, and are governed by the laws of the country where J, L, and C operate. What exactly J, L, and C do when any of their internal decision procedures return a "reject" in the course of operation is beyond the scope of SAMPL.
For example, what happens when C decides to reject the IO when the IO violates statutory company policy in some way? Or what is the course of action for L to follow if J decides to reject its surveillance request?
(3) Handling Multiple Users: We described, prototyped, and analyzed SAMPL with an example of a single user being surveilled by L, this can easily be extended to multiple users (I ∈ [1..α]) by modifying the SO to include a list of users' identities. We would then have V K 1 RI , · · · , V K α RI , V K 1 AI , · · · , V K α AI , and V K 1
. When multiple identities are surveilled, J needs to add a random string (salt) to each user's identity(V K 1 RI , · · · , V K α RI ) and hash it before putting it in P1 of SO. This randomization added to each identity will help protect the identities of each of the surveilled users from each other whenever the SO expires and is released to the individuals being surveilled. The random salts for all the V K RI 's are shared with L and C.
(4) Hard reject/soft reject: Whenever an SR or SRR is rejected by E, perhaps due to clerical errors, administrative errors, or otherwise honest mistakes on the part of C or L, E just responds with a reject message and takes no further action (soft reject). E can assess how many times a certain party's request/response has been rejected. Once this number of rejections reaches a threshold, which can be a system parameter, E informs the party whose request/response was rejected, and the judge J , and stores a local copy of the reason for the rejection (to provide to J upon request), and writes a "fail" message to the BC -a hard reject. Note that for fined grained information on errors/malicious behaviors, E can choose to post soft reject on BC.
(5) Auditable data structures: Auditable data structures [26] implemented on C's servers could also be used by E to verify that C is non-malicious and complying with court orders. This implementation would need careful system design with read/write counters on the data stores with E having access to the counters. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a practical mechanism for secure auditing of surveillance orders by an overseer called Enforcer, E. The E checks if law enforcement agencies and companies are over-requesting and over-sharing user data, respectively, beyond what is permitted by the surveillance order, in a privacy-preserving way, such that E does not know the real identities of the users getting surveilled, nor does it get to read the users' unencrypted data. Our system also has inbuilt checks and balances to require unsealing of surveillance orders at the appropriate times, thus enabling accounting of the surveillance operation being surveilled to verify that lawful procedures were followed, protecting users from government overreach, and helping law enforcement agencies and companies demonstrate that they followed the rule of law.
A ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS BETWEEN I AND C Protocol 10 is initiated by I when she needs to establish her real identity RI (corresponding to an email address and represented by keypair (V K RI , SK RI )) and tie it to an anonymized identity AI (corresponding to a nickname for the email address and represented by keypair (V K AI , SK AI )). I can choose to create a new AI if she needs to change the current AI in case SK AI gets compromised. The goal of Protocol 10 is for I to establish her (V K RI , SK RI ), (V K AI , SK AI ) keypairs, and prove in zero-knowledge to C that V K AI could have been generated only by someone who had knowledge of SK RI , and that the two key-pairs are related to each other by a DDH tuple. To this end, I and C do a Chaum-Pedersen-style interactive ZKP [16] (ZKP) for I to prove her anonymized identity, AI to C. The proof π AI can be made non-interactive by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform [20] . If C chooses to accept the proof as valid, it asks I to send a signed copy of the transcript of the proof, σ AI . C stores π AI and σ AI . Protocol 11 is initiated by I when she needs to establish her pseudonymous identity (PI) keypair
.m]. I could have multiple PIs tied in to a single AI, but only one can be active at a given point in time. I creates a new PI i+1 if SK PI i gets compromised or after a certain time period, which could be a system parameter.
The goal of Protocol 11 is for I to establish her (V K PI i , SK PI i ) keypairs, and prove in zero-knowledge to C that V K PI i could only have been generated by someone who had knowledge of SK AI , and the two key-pairs are related to each other by a DDH tuple. To this end, I and C do a Chaum-Pedersen-style IZKP [16] , similar to Protocol 10 for I to prove her current pseudonymous identity, V K PI i to C (made non-interactive by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform). If C chooses to accept the proof, PI i , as valid, it asks I to send a signed copy σ PI i of the transcript of the proof. C stores π PI i and σ PI i . π PI i and σ PI i are used by C during surveillance to prove Protocol 10: Setup of (RI, AI) keypairs.
Inputs : Public parameters: Group G, q = |G|, д, h ∈ G. ZKP Claim: V K AI was generated by someone with knowledge of SK AI , SK RI .
Witness: SK AI , SK RI . Output : Signed ZKP: Sign S K RI (π AI ) Parties :C and I 1 I picks a, a ′ ← Z q , sets SK RI = a, SK AI = a ′ , and
, and sends DDH tuple (д, X = д a , Y = д a ′ , Z = д a ·a ′ ) to C. = (X s · y 1 ) mod q, and if Y z ? = (Z s · y 2 ) mod q. If checks verify, C accepts the response as valid, asks I to send signed transcript of proof, π AI .
9
I sends σ AI = Sign S K RI (π AI = H (д||V K RI ||V K AI ||ω 1 ||y 1 ||y 2 ||s ||z)) to C.
end
that PI i was generated by I . Although we have abstracted it out, a Pedersen commitment is of the form д v ·h r ( mod q), where д, h ∈ G, q = |G|, v is the value to be committed to, and r is the commitment randomness. Here h = д a mod q, where a ← Z q is chosen by the receiver of the commitment. We assume h is fairly chosen in a distributed manner by I , C. Note that the ZKP and the signature on the ZKP can be replaced by a single signature proof of zero-knowledge of knowledge [15] , but we do not discuss this optimization in this paper.
B UC FUNCTIONALITIES AND ANALYSIS
The notion of UC security is captured by the pair of definitions below:
Definition B.1. (UC-emulation [12] ) Let π and ϕ be probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) protocols. We say that π UC-emulates ϕ if for any PPT adversary A there exists a PPT adversary S such that for any balanced PPT environment Z we have EXEC ϕ,S,Z ≈ EXEC π ,A,Z Definition B.2. (UC-realization [12] ) Let F be an ideal functionality and let π be a protocol. We say that π UC-realizes F if π UC-emulates the ideal protocol for F.
We describe the functionalities of F Surveil : F SAMPL zk , F init , F create , F BC . We assume that F Surveil maintains a table τ , with information about the individuals being surveilled, and the surveillance orders. A single row of the table would look like: (V K RI , SO, soid) where Protocol 11: Setup of (PI i ) keypair.
Inputs : Public parameters: Group G, |G| = q, д, h ∈ G, V K AI , SK AI . Claim : V K PI i was generated by someone with knowledge of SK AI , SK PI i .
Witness : SK AI , SK PI i . Output : Signed ZKP: Sign S K AI (π PI i ). Parties :C and I 1 for i ∈ [1..m] do 2 I picks a ′′ ← Z q , sets SK PI i = a ′′ , and V K PI i = д a ′′ .
3 begin 4 I parses SK AI as a ′ and V K AI as д a ′ .
5
I picks ω 2 = д a ′ ·a ′′ . I sends DDH tuple (д, zkpVerf = (Y = д a ′ , P = д a ′′ , Q = ω 2 )) to C. 6 C picks a challenge s 1 ← Z q , and sends Com(s 1 ) to I , where Com is a Pedersen commitment.
7
I picks r ′ 1 ← Z q , computes y ′ 1 = д r ′ 1 mod q, and y ′ 2 = д a ′′ ·r ′ 1 mod q, and sends y ′ 1 , y ′ 2 to C. 8 C sends s 1 to I .
9
I verifies Com, computes response:
If checks verify, C accepts the response as valid, asks I to send signed transcript of proof, π PI i .
11
I sends σ PI i = Sign S K AI (π PI i = H (д||V K AI ||V K PI i ||ω 2 ||y ′ 1 ||y ′ 2 ||s 1 ||z 1 )) to C. soid denotes the id number of the SO which is associated with V K RI . We use ⊥ to denote unresponsive parties, malformed replies to the ideal functionalities, and ideal functionalities returning fail messages to parties. F SAMPL zk : We define our ideal functionality for zero-knowledge proofs, F SAMPL zk , based on the ideal zero knowledge functionality, F zk defined by Canetti et al. [14] . While [14] deals with generic relations, our F SAMPL zk is restricted only to discrete-log relations, and also involves the ideal functionality writing the claim to the shared table τ . F SAMPL zk is given in Figure 5 , and the F zk functionality of [14] is given in Figure 6 .
F SAMPL zk is parametrized by a prime-order cyclic group G, |G| = q, д ∈ G, a ∈ Z q , and a session id, sid. The prover, I sends a claim to be proven, V K RI to F zk , and a witness a. F zk checks if д a = V K RI , i.e., if the claim is correct and forwards V K RI to the verifier C and the ideal-world adversary S, and writes V K RI into table τ .
F zk as given in Figure 6 , is parametrized by a relation R, and a session id, sid. The prover, P sends a claim to be proven, x to F zk , and a witness w. F zk checks if R(x, w) = 1, i.e., if the claim is correct and forwards x to the verifier V and the ideal-world adversary S.
F init : The F init ideal functionality described in Figure 7 , interacts with J, L, and C, initiates the process for creating a SO, and posts the SO to the BC. L initiates contact with F init by sending a Functionality F SAMPL zk F SAMPL zk proceeds as follows, running with prover I , verifier C, an adversary S. Let G be a prime-order cyclic group, д ∈ G, |G| = q, and a ∈ Z q .
(1) Upon receiving (V K RI , sid, a) from I , if д a = V K RI , send (V K RI , sid) to C and S, else exit. Write (V K RI ) to table τ and exit. [14] (create − IO, evidence, V K RI ) request tuple to F init . F init forwards the request to J , who can accept or decline it. . F init then generates a key K ← {0, 1} λ , generates a string regarding the surveillance order, data ← {0, 1} λ , which includes evidence provided by L, crimes committed by V K RI , reason for sealing, etc. It also generates metadata, which includes the date the SO will be unsealed. F init writes (SO, soid) to the table τ , in the V K RI row. F init then creates the SO tuple: (metadata, C = E K (V K RI , data)), sends (K, C) to J, L, C, calls F BC and posts the SO on the BC. Finally, when the SO needs to be unsealed, F init proactively contacts I , whom V K RI belongs to, and gives her the decrypted contents of the SO.
F create : F create is given in Figure 8 . F create creates a request SR and response SRR. L first contacts F create for creating an SR by sending V K RI , upon which F create looks up table τ for an SO corresponding to V K RI . If none has been entered by F init , that means L is not authorized to surveil V K RI , and F create returns ⊥ to L. Else F create proceeds with generating SR and forwards SR to L and C. At this point C is expected to respond to SR with V K RI 's emails, batch information, and Merkle tree information required to verify the emails are from the correct batches.
We represent all this information by a string, records. If C ignores the request, F create will write C's identity to BC, along with the associated SO (this means C is behaving maliciously). If C responds with the records, F create will first verify that the records belong to the surveillance time-period as given in the metadata part of the SO. If verification succeeds, F create will create the SRR, which will be sent to L and C. Finally F create posts the hash of SR, SRR to BC respectively.
F BC : The blockchain functionality is given in Figure 9 . F BC receives messages from F init and F create . F BC writes tuples to the Functionality F create (1) L sends a tuple (create − SR, V K RI ) to F create . F create looks up the SO corresponding to V K RI in τ . If none exists, F create sends ⊥ to L and exits. Else, F create generates an SR = (SO, V K RI ) and forwards it to L and C.
(2) C replies to F create with a tuple (V K RI , records ← {0, 1} λ ), where records ← {0, 1} λ denote V K RI 's emails, and verification metadata. If C replies with ⊥, F create will call F BC and write (SO, C) to the BC and exit.
(3) In response to C's tuple, F create verifies records, and creates an SRR = (SO, records) tuple, and forwards to L and C.
(4) F create calls F BC , posts H (SR) and H (SRR) to the BC and exits. blockchain, and sends a copy of the new block, B, to parties J, L, C, I . This is done by sending (update, B). The party can either accept the update, or decline (unresponsive, disconnected, or non-cooperating parties). When a dormant party wishes to update itself, it can request a copy of the full blockchain by sending a read message to F BC .
B.1 Discussion and Analysis
We now briefly discuss the correctness of our ideal functionalities, some of our motivating design choices, including aspects that may seem unusual.
B.1.1 Correctness. The privacy properties our system aims to provide are accountability for L and C, protection against a forgetful J Functionality F BC (1) F BC receives three kinds of write messages: F init writes SO, F create writes (SO, C) and F create writes (H (SR), H (SRR)). F BC writes the tuples to the blockchain and sends a copy of the newest block B to all parties, J, L, C, I by sending a tuple (update, B). (2) Each party either replies with (agree, B) or ⊥. In the former case, the party updates the local copy of the blockchain, and is synced with the global blockchain. However if the reply was ⊥, the party now has an outdated copy of the blockchain. (3) In the event that an outdated party wants to get synced with the blockchain, it sends a message (read) to F BC , F BC replies with (update, B ′ ), where B ′ is the copy of the entire blockchain. who might forget to unseal orders, and protection against a malicious I and C. The design of our ideal functionalities need to capture these properties. Accountability is provided by the fact that F create generates the SR and SRR, thus ensuring that no data is over-requested by L, or over-shared by C, both in terms of redundant data belonging to the same user, or other users' data. F init creates the SO and guarantees that the SO will get unsealed by F init before it exits, thus providing protection against forgetful J . Since F SAMPL zk checks the witness and generates the ZKP for each V K RI , it ensures that a user cannot create a fake ZKP for V K RI that passes verification, yet the corresponding SK RI cannot be used for decrypting the user's email records. Protection against a malicious C which tries to include fake data in an SRR is provided by F create , which verifies C's returned user information before creating an SRR. B.1.2 Peculiar design choices. (1) In F init , J, C can return ⊥ to F init in Step 1 and Step 2 respectively: This is to model the fact that in the real-world, J has the right to refuse a surveillance request by L, and C has the right to refuse or appeal an intermediate order by J .
(2) F init creates an SO, and F create generates the SR and SRR for SO, but only after being contacted by L (Step 1 of F create ): This is because in the real-world, L might get an SO authorized by J , but may choose not to follow it up with any action, i.e., eventually not conduct any surveillance, e.g., because L needs to invest its limited resources in higher-priority matters, budget cuts after SO was issued, etc.
(3) F create writes C's identity to the BC if C doesn't respond with I 's email records in Step 2 of F create : We assume that I is an (email) customer of C, and C will have email records associated with I for the surveillance period. These emails are stored only with C. If C deliberately chooses not to respond to, or refuses an SR, after having accepted the IO that the SR is a follow up on (F init , Step 2), then that can only be construed as malicious behavior on the part of C. Hence F create will expose malicious C's identity on the public BC.
B.2 Proof
We now give the proof of Theorem 7.1. Proof : Our goal is to describe a simulator S such that for any realworld A running with SAMPL, Z cannot distinguish A from an ideal-world S running with F Surveil . S runs A internally, simulates all inputs A is expecting, and gives A's outputs to F Surveil , who will complete the simulation in the ideal-world. S reflects the choices of A in the ideal-world, and reflects the protocol outcomes and aborts of the ideal-world in the real-world. If A cheats, S aborts.
That is, any attempt by A to cheat in the real-world will result in the protocol aborting in the both, the ideal and real worlds. Hence it follows that no PPT Z can distinguish between EXEC SAMPL,A,Z and EXEC F Surveil ,S,Z . We now consider a complete run of the protocol, starting from when I sets up her RI, AI, π keypairs with C and ending when L receives the validated SRR from a subset of E.
First, S needs to create keypairs (V K RI , SK RI ), (V K AI , SK AI ), (V K PI j , SK PI j ), j ∈ [1..m]. S simulates a UC-secure digital signature scheme, S sig , that UC-realizes the ideal digital signature functionality, F sig (see [13] for UC-secure signatures definitions), and creates the keypairs. The V K RI , V K AI and V K PI j will be handed over to A. If A wishes to corrupt I , SK RI , SK AI and SK PI j will also be given to A.
S will also have to generate the zero-knowledge proofs associated with V K AI and V K PI j . S runs the steps of Protocol 10, computes π AI = (H (д||V K RI ||V K AI ||ω 1 ||y 1 ||y 2 ||s ||z)) and generates σ AI by calling S sig . S then gives π AI and σ AI to A along with the keys. S follows a similar procedure for generating the π PI j , σ PI j of Protocol 11. In the ideal-world, S will call F sig to generate V K RI , and call F SAMPL zk for generating the ZKP corresponding toV K RI . If A rejects the ZKPs or signatures, S aborts the execution.
S then needs to setup shared key K C I of Protocol 1, and pass it to A, if A has corrupted either C and/or I . S creates a key K ← {0, 1} λ by calling F init , and passes it to A. Finally, S generates a random batch-size bSize and gives to A. This completes the simulation of the setup phase.
Next, S needs to pass on inputs to A during the SO creation phase, and simulate the corresponding actions in the ideal-world (actions of Protocol 3). If A has corrupted L, A will generate the SR = (V K RI , evidence), else, S generates the SR = (V K RI , evidence) and gives the SR to A. We recollect from our adversary model that J is forgetful, but not malicious. In other words, A cannot corrupt J .
Once J (impersonated by S) has received the SR from A, J will validate it, and decide whether to accept it or not. Once J decides, it will give its output to A. A will then pass on the IO to C, through corrupted L. C will decide whether to accept the IO or not. If A has corrupted C, then this communication is handled locally by A, and need not be simulated. If C is honest, its action will be simulated by S.
C responds to the IO, and generates an SRR = (V K AI ||π AI ||σ AI ),
and sends SRR to J, L. In the ideal world, S calls F init , which creates an IO and sends to J, L, C. If A cheats, i.e., includes a wrong π AI , σ AI inside the SRR, then S will send a corresponding malformed message to F init , which will then abort (Step 2 of Figure 7) , and S aborts the execution of A. S then generates the SO as a honest J would, and gives the final SO to A. If either of C or L are corrupted by we are done. In the ideal world, S will call F create , F SAMPL zk , and F sig to create and sign the SRR, respectively.
(2) Case 1: If C is corrupted, A will create the SRR; the SO is given to A. Firstly, A can return a verification fail on the SO created by S. If this happens, S will abort the simulation.
If A chooses to proceed with the simulation, A will create the Merkle hash trees with the H (C x ) at the leaves, sibling hashes, etc.. A will give the ZKPs, π AI , π PI j and signatures on the ZKPs, σ AI , σ PI j to S. If any do not verify, S aborts. A will generate the final SRR, and H (SRR). If the SRR is malformed, in the ideal-world, S will cause F create to abort by having C not reply to an SRR. F create will write malicious C's identity to the blockchain by calling F BC . If a minority of S ⊆ E are corrupted, A can return a fail on the ZKP verification, upon which S aborts. If A rejects the SRR, or refuses to produce a signature σ S SRR , S aborts. In the ideal world, S will corrupt C such that C does not repond to F create 's request for an SRR, upon which F create will write C's identity to the blockchain by calling F BC , and will then abort. If A validates the SRR and produces signature σ S SRR , S will simulate the honest majority. In the ideal world S will call F sig . Lastly, S will give K C I to A, if A had not already corrupted C and/or I , and obtained K C I earlier. This concludes our proof.
